Land & Water Law Review
Volume 18

Issue 1

Article 11

1983

Torts - Assumption of Risk and the Obvious Danger Rule - Primary
or Secondary Assumption of Risk - Sherman v. Platte County
Barbara L. Lauer

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water

Recommended Citation
Lauer, Barbara L. (1983) "Torts - Assumption of Risk and the Obvious Danger Rule - Primary or Secondary
Assumption of Risk - Sherman v. Platte County," Land & Water Law Review: Vol. 18 : Iss. 1 , pp. 373 - 391.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol18/iss1/11

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Land & Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship.

Lauer: Torts - Assumption of Risk and the Obvious Danger Rule - Primary
TORTS-Assumption of Risk and the Obvious Danger Rule. Primary or Secondary Assumption of Risk? Sherman v. Platte County, 642 P.2d 787
(Wyo. 1982).

Deloris Sherman slipped and fell on ice in the Platte
County Courthouse parking lot while engaged in the process
of licensing her motor vehicle.' She brought suit against
Platte County for the personal injuries she sustained. At
trial, the jury was instructed that the landowner owes no
duty of care for obvious dangers' and, predictably, found
for the defendant. The Wyoming Supreme Court (Justice
Raper writing for the majority, Justice Rooney specially
concurring) affirmed the judgment for the defendant. The
court rejected plaintiff's claim that because the obvious danger rule is the equivalent of assumption of risk, it is not a
complete bar to recovery under Wyoming's comparative negligence statute.' The supreme court held that comparative
negligence merely allows comparison of fault once both parties are found negligent, but does not create any duty where
none existed.'
BACKGROUND

The doctrine of assumption of risk is an affirmative
defense the negligent defendant employs to deny liability.
The risk the plaintiff assumes is one ordinarily within the
scope of defendant's duty. Defendant may have in fact
breached that duty, but is relieved from liability because
plaintiff assumed responsibility. The doctrine focuses on
plaintiff's behavior.
Copyright© 1983 by the University of Wyoming.

1. Sherman v. Platte County, 642 P.2d 787, 788 (Wyo. 1982).
2. Jury Instruction 17: "An owner or occupant of land or premises does not
have an obligation to protect his invitees against dangers that are known
to them or that are so obvious and apparent that they may reasonably be
expected to discover such dangers." 642 P.2d at 788.
3. Brief for Appellant at 20-21, Sherman v. Platte County, 642 P.2d 787 (Wyo.
1982).
4. 642 P.2d at 790. The comparative negligence statute, Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-109
(a) (1977) provides:
Contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery in an action
by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for
negligence resulting in death or injury to person or property, if
the contributory negligence was not as great as the negligence of
the person against whom recovery is sought. Any damages allowed
shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the person recovering.
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In certain other instances, however, assumption of risk
simply means that the defendant owes no duty to plaintiff.
Plaintiff assumes a risk always outside the scope of defendant's duty to protect him. The law limits the defendant's
duty by declaring some risks to be outside that duty. There
is no reference to plaintiff's behavior.
A 1959 New Jersey case, Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc.,5 summarizes scholarly analysis of the two
types of assumption of risk.' Primary assumption of risk
merely negates duty.' The defendant owes no duty to plaintiff, regardless of plaintiff's conduct.' Defendant is not liable whether or not plaintiff behaved reasonably. The concept of secondary assumption of risk is similar to the defense
of contributory negligence because it shares the standard
of reasonable care.' Plaintiff is held to assume the risk only
if he failed to act as a reasonably prudent person would have
acted. The Meistrich labels will be used in this note.'0
Many have grappled with the problems created by these
two kinds of assumption of risk without resolving the confusion. 1 Neither the courts"2 nor the scholars" are in agree5. 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959), rev'g, 148 A.2d 199 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1959).
6. Actually, there are three types of assumption of risk. The third type arises
in cases of express contract to relieve defendant of liability for his negligence, but this type is of little importance to the present discussion. See
generally, Gaetanos, Assumption of Risk: Casuistry in the Law of Negligence, 83 W. VA. L. REV. 471, 473 (1981):
Most courts have identified two types of assumption of risk:
express and implied. Dean Wade has spotted the same two, as did
Dean Keeton. But Professors Harper and James have identified
three types, and Professor Salmond a different three. Dean Prosser noted four types, and the Restatement (Second) proclaimed a
similar four. Professor Keeton not to be outdone, found six. Still
others, like Professor Mansfield, have eschewed the jargon ...
(footnotes omitted).
7. Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 155 A.2d at 93 (1959).
8. Id.
9. Annot., 35 A.L.R.3d 230, 268 (1971).
10. But see McGrath v. American Cyanamid Co., 41 N.J. 472, 196 A.2d 238,
239-41 (1963) (New Jersey will not use any assumption of risk terminology,
but will use only negligence and contributory negligence); 31 A.T.L.A.J.
287, 292 (1965).
11. 31 A.T.L.A.J. 287, 291-92 (1965).
12. Annot., 35 A.L.R.3d 230, 268 (1971).
13. See DOOLEY, 1 MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION 155 (1977);
Wade, The Place of Assumption of Risk in the Law of Negligence, 22 LA. L.
REv. 5, 11-14 (1961); James, Contributory Negligence, 62 YALE L.J. 691,
698 (1953); Malone, Contributory Negligence and the Landowner Cases, 29
MINN. L. REV. 61, 78 (1945); P. Keeton, Assumption of Risk and the Land-
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ment on the relation of secondary assumption of risk to other
defenses or to primary assumption of risk.
Assumption of risk as a protection for the defendant
was in keeping with nineteenth century ideas of individual
responsibility, 4 but today assumption of risk is in disfavor
as a defense. 5 The anomaly is that as a duty limitation it
persists. The elimination of assumption of risk as a duty
limitation has probably been delayed in part because under
traditional negligence theory, it makes little practical difference how assumption of risk is classified or how it is
dealt with procedurally. The result is always the same: the
plaintiff will not recover. Either assumption of risk or contributory negligence will bar completely his recovery from
a negligent defendant, and he cannot recover from a nonnegligent defendant who owes him no duty. Under any system of comparative negligence, however, how assumption of
risk is stated may determine whether or not the plaintiff can
recover. If the secondary assumption of risk doctrine is
applied, then defendant has a duty of reasonable care. If
defendant has breached this duty, plaintiff's behavior is
evaluated to determine if he contributed to the accident and
to what degree he should recover. If primary assumption of
risk is used, then, as no duty is owed, finding the defendant
negligent is foreclosed, and plaintiff is precluded from recovering.
The simple analysis above is not universally applied.
There is, in fact, disagreement as to the effect comparative
negligence has on secondary assumption of risk.' 6 Assumption of risk remains a complete defense under comparative
negligence in a few jurisdictions." In some, assumption of
owner, 20 TEx. L. REV. 562, 574 (1942); Bohlen, Contributory Negligence,
21 HARV. L. REV. 233, 245-52 (1908). But see HARPER AND JAMES, 2 THE

LAW OF TORTS 107 (Supp. 1968); Pedrick, Taken for a Ride: The Automobile Guest and Assumption of Risk, 22 LA. L. REV. 90, 92-93 (1961);
Green, Assumed Risk as a Defense, 22 LA. L. REV. 77, 85 (1961).
14. Bohlen, supra note 13, at 254: "The duty of care for others manifestly
should be no higher than the duty of self-protection." See also id. at 254-55
(which sets out background and rationale for the self-protection rule).
15. 31 A.T.L.A.J. 287, 291 (1965).
16. Green, The Negligence Action, ARIz. ST. L.J. 369, 384 (1974).
17.

WOODS, THE NEGLIGENCE CASE: COMPARATIVE FAULT 155 (1968).
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risk is abolished as a separate defense and the term means
only that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent."8 In yet
others, assumption of risk is retained as a separate defense,
but the result is the same as if it were considered to be a
form of contributory negligence."9
Comparative negligence theory is aimed toward the
abolition of absolute defenses. It succeeds in all but two
situations. It fails in the few jurisdictions where secondary
assumption of risk remains a complete defense. It also fails
where primary assumption of risk operates to limit duty.
The obvious danger rule is a theory that limits defendant's liability for injuries caused by dangers that are obvious to the plaintiff. Some jurisdictions treat the obvious
danger rule as secondary assumption of risk-the plaintiff
assumes the risks of obvious dangers. Others interpret the
obvious danger rule to be primary assumption of risk-the
defendant owes no duty to protect against obvious dangers.
As with assumption of risk, the form of the obvious danger
rule under traditional negligence makes little practical difference, because the plaintiff will never recover. Under the
doctrine of comparative negligence, if the obvious danger
rule is treated as primary assumption of risk, plaintiff cannot recover; if secondary, the plaintiff has a chance to
recover.

Wyoming was the seventeenth state to adopt a comparative negligence scheme. ° The statute took effect in 1973.21
Long before, the Wyoming court ruled that assumption of
risk would not be a defense separate from contributory negligence. 2 Thus, plaintiff's behavior in assuming a risk was
to be compared with defendant's negligence under the comparative negligence statute. The early merger apparently
did not anticipate the impact of comparative negligence on
no-duty assumption of risk.
18. Id. at 129-55.
19. Id. at 128.
20.

Comment, Comparative Negligence in Wyoming, 8 LAND & WATER L. REV.

597, 597 (1973).
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WYOMING CASES

Treatment of the obvious danger rule varies with the
context in which it is employed and frequently the issues
are confused. In Wyoming, the obvious danger rule has been

applied in cases involving collateral issues of master and
servant law, 3 plaintiff's status as trespasser, licensee, or
invitee,"4 governmental liability, 5 and ice and snow as nat-

ural conditions in Wyoming.

6

Even apart from the con-

straint placed on its uniform development by the presence
of these issues, the role of the obvious danger rule in Wyoming is unclear. The confusion began early as the court

shifted from one theory to another and back again.
Four early cases illustrate the court's vacillation. A
1914 case, Carney Coal Co. v. Benedict,27 concerned an employee who returned to work in a pit after debris had fallen
from the sides of the excavation." Although the court noted

that the danger of a cave-in was obvious," it held that the
plaintiff's return to work was enough to show his assump-

tion of that risk.30 The obviousness of the condition was a
factor in plaintiff's secondary assumption of risk. The court

found no negation of defendant's duty of reasonable care.
In Boatman v. Miles,"' a 1921 case, the court declared
that to say the servant assumed the risk was another way to

say no duty existed. 2 Thus the court embraced the primary
21. WYO. STAT. § 1-1-109 (1977) (originally enacted as 1973 Wyo. SESS. LAws
ch. 28, § 1, WYO. STAT. § 1-7.2(a) (Supp. 1973)).

22. Ford Motor Co. v. Arguello, 382 P.2d 886, 891 (Wyo. 1963) ; Rocky Mountain Trucking Co. v. Taylor, 79 Wyo. 461, 335 P.2d 448, 451 (1959).
23. See infra text accompanying notes 27, 31, 35, 43, and 52 for a discussion of
some master/servant cases.
24. Yalowizer v. Husky Oil Co., 629 P.2d 465 (Wyo. 1981); See also infra
cases cited note 26, which also involve status of plaintiff.
25. Oroz v. Carbon County Comm'rs, 575 P.2d 1155 (Wyo. 1978), remanded
jury verdict afi'd, 598 P.2d 432 (Wyo. 1979); Town of Cody v. Soth, 36
Wyo. 66, 252 P. 1021 (1927).
26. Johnson v. Hawkins, 622 P.2d 941 (Wyo. 1981); LeGrande v. Misner, 490
P.2d 1252 (Wyo. 1971).
27. 22 Wyo. 362, 140 P. 1013 (1914), rev'g on rehearing, 21 Wyo. 163, 129 P.
1024 (1913), reh'g denied, 144 P. 19 (1914).
28. 140 P.2d at 1015.
29. Id. at 1014.
30. Id. at 1015.
31. 27 Wyo. 481, 199 P. 933 (1921).
32. 199 P. at 935.
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assumption of risk formulation. But in 1925, in Chicago and
Northwestern Ry. v. Ott,3 the court said that the servant
assumed the risk of open and obvious dangers associated
with his employment,34 and that defendant's negligence was
a question for the jury. 5 The obviousness of the danger did
not limit defendant's duty as primary assumption of risk
would require, but was an indication that plaintiff assumed
the risk in the secondary sense.
In Loney v. Laramie Auto Co.,"0 in 1927, the court apparently rejected the no-duty formulation of the obvious
danger rule. The court favored a consideration of contributory negligence.87 The defendant owed plaintiff-invitee the
duty of reasonable care and an obvious danger did not make
the plaintiff contributorily negligent as a matter of law."'
In Loney, the court evidently considered the danger's obviousness as an indication the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. The differing treatment of obvious dangers in these
cases demonstrates the court's failure to determine whether
the obvious danger rule involves primary or secondary assumption of risk.
The inconsistency evident in the earlier cases is also
present in more recent cases. In the 1966 case McKee v.
Pacific Power and Light Co.,"9 the plaintiff was injured
when a tie wire supporting the television cable on which he
was working broke, came in contact with defendant's highvoltage power line, and shocked him. The court proposed
three bases for upholding a directed verdict for defendant.
The first involved an application of the obvious danger rule
to limit defendant's duty.4" The other two involved plaintiff's own negligence as a bar to his recovery.4 ' The court
did not indicate on which basis it was deciding the case. It
33. 33 Wyo. 200, 237 P. 238 (1925), reh'g denied, 238 P. 287 (Wyo. 1925),
cert. denied, 296 U.S. 585 (1926).
34. 237 P. at 241.
35. Id. at 242.
36. 36 Wyo. 339, 255 P. 350 (1927).
37. 255 P. at 353.
38. Id. at 351.
39. 417 P.2d 426 (Wyo. 1966).
40. Id. at 427.
41. Id. at 428.
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merely concluded by noting that in the absence of evidence
showing defendant could have foreseen and prevented the
accident better than plaintiff, the directed verdict would
stand.2 Although the court cited the obvious danger rule,
it seems as likely that the decision was based on plaintiff's
secondary assumption of risk or contributory negligencetheories incompatible with the concept of primary assumption of risk.
In Berry v. Iowa Mid-West Land and Livestock Co., 3 a
1967 case, a servant proceeded with an electrical wiring
project, knowing he had inadequate equipment." The court
said the servant assumed obvious risks of employment, but
noted that if defendant had been negligent, then plaintiff
was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. 5 This is
consistent with the merger" of assumption of risk and contributory negligence, and inconsistent with a no-duty formulation of the obvious danger rule.
In a 1971 case, Continental Motors Corp. v. Joly,4 7 a
pilot, injured in an airplane crash caused by engine failure,
brought suit for personal injuries against the manufacturer."
The court held there was no proof that negligence on the
part of the manufacturer was a proximate cause of the
injuries sustained. Therefore it did not need to decide if
the pilot was contributorily negligent as a matter of law.
Nonetheless, the court did note that even if the manufacturer
had been negligent, the pilot would be barred from recovery
by his contributory negligence. The court said that the jury
found that the pilot was not contributorily negligent. However, the court noted that the pilot landed because of engine
roughness and resumed flight only after the plane was serviced. Thus, the danger was obvious to the pilot. 9 The court
cited the McKee obvious danger rule and explained that
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 429.
424 P.2d 409 (Wyo. 1967).
Id. at 410.
Id. at 411.
See supra text accompanying note 22.
483 P.2d 244 (Wyo. 1971), reh'g denied mem., (1971).
Id. at 245.
Id. at 246.
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unless it was assumed the mechanic had more expertise than
the highly qualified, experienced pilot, the court would have
to adhere to the rule in McKee and hold that the pilot failed
to exercise due care for his own safety. ° Although it did
not apply the rule, the Joly court indicated that the McKee
formulation of the obvious danger rule reflects secondary,
rather than primary, assumption of risk. The court in
Sherman interpreted McKee differently.
Even after the comparative negligence statute was
adopted, the inconsistent application of the obvious danger
rule continued. A comparison of the 1976 case, Bluejacket
v. Carney,"' with the 1979 case, Brittain v. Booth, 2 illustrates the disparity.
In Bluejacket, plaintiff was an outfitter who had been
a guest 3 at defendant's remote mountain resort for two
weeks prior to his accident. Plaintiff knew that the path to
his cabin was icy, unlit, and rough, but used it anyway, and
fell down. 4 Plaintiff brought suit for damages for his injuries against the owner. Summary judgment for defendant
was affirmed because 1) plaintiff never stated what caused
him to fall,5 and 2) there was no showing that defendant
was negligent."0 The court found that the obvious danger
rule relieved defendant of a duty to remove the ice and snow
from the path, and plaintiff did not propose any other duty
or standard of care by which defendant might have been
found negligent. 7 Justice Rose concurred with the majority
only because no causal connection was shown between the
icy path and the fall. Noting that bad appeals make bad law,
he warned that Bluejacket might be a classic example of the
maxim.5" Justice Rose did not agree that no standard of
care was established. He would have reserved the question
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
550 P.2d 494 (Wyo. 1976).
601 P.2d 532 (Wyo. 1979).
For various ways plaintiff might be classified, see 550 P.2d 494, 499 (Rose,
J., specially concurring).
Id. at 496.
Id.
Id. at 498.
Id. at 497.
Id. at 498 (Rose, J., specially concurring).
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of negligence for the factfinder
He urged the use of the
standard of reasonable care for business invitees and noted
that the obvious danger rule is not always an absolute bar
1
to a plaintiff's recovery. 0 Justice Rose cited Hape v. Rath"
for the proposition that the plaintiff is not necessarily contributorily negligent if he knows of a danger and carefully
attempts to deal with it. Justice Rose articulated the obvious
danger rule as involving secondary assumption of risk, while
the majority cast the obvious danger rule in the primary
assumption of risk mold.
In Brittain, plaintiff was injured when the sides of an
excavation in which he was working fell on him.2 The majority held that plaintiff assumed the risk of such accidents,"
and reasoned that since under comparative negligence, plaintiff's assumption of risk is to be compared to defendant's
negligence, the jury verdict finding plaintiff contributorily
negligent must stand. 4 The court acknowledged that the
pit was obviously dangerous, because the sides were neither
shored nor sloped and thus likely to cave in. 5 But the obvious
danger rule was not invoked to remove defendant's duty.
Rather, the obviousness went to the question of plaintiff's
secondary assumption of risk. Justice Rose dissented because the danger was not obvious.0 6 He, too, would have
evaluated plaintiff's behavior in light of the nature of the
condition. The whole court thus treated the obvious danger
rule as an expression of secondary, rather than primary,
assumption of risk.
Whether Brittain overrules Bluejacket or not, the tension manifest in these cases between the treatment of the
obvious danger rule as secondary assumption of risk or
contributory negligence on the one hand and no-duty primary
assumption of risk on the other hand indicates that in Wyo59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 499 (Rose, J., specially concurring).
Id. at 500 (Rose, J., specially concurring).
492 P.2d 974 (Wyo. 1972).
601 P.2d at 533.
Id. at 536.
Id. at 534.
Id. at 535.
Id. at 540 (Rose, J., dissenting).
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ming the obvious danger rule is not firmly grounded in duty
limitation.
ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S DECISION

The Wyoming Supreme Court in Sherman v. Platte
County rejected Deloris Sherman's contention that comparative negligence abrogates the obvious danger rule. 7 The
basis for her contention was that the obvious danger rule is
"but a refined statement of the more colloquial phrase 'assumption of risk'.-" Since in Wyoming assumption of risk
is but a class of contributory negligence, and since comparative negligence removed contributory negligence as a complete bar to plaintiff's recovery, plaintiff argued that she
should not be barred from recovery just because assumption
of risk is "paraphrased" in terms of the no-duty obvious
danger rule.6" Plaintiff's objection centered around Jury Instruction 17: "An owner or occupant of land or premises
does not have an obligation to protect his invitees against
dangers that are known to them or that are so obvious and
apparent that they may reasonably be expected to discover
such dangers. ' ' 7
It was not disputed that plaintiff knew of the icy condition of the parking lot where she fell.7' Plaintiff urged
that the jury should have been instructed that plaintiff's
knowledge of the dangerous condition was merely a factor
to be considered when apportioning fault, but that obviousness did not remove the duty to exercise reasonable care to
keep the premises safe. 2
67. 642 P.2d at 790. The court apparently also rejected Sherman's contentions
that 1) an exception to the obvious danger rule applies where defendant
should anticipate harm despite the obviousness (Brief for Appellant, supra
note 3, at 10) ; 2) a public utility owes a higher duty of care to entrants
as of right-that of reasonable care under all the circumstances (Id. at
15) ; 3) the ice on the courthouse parking lot was an artificial, rather than
a natural, accumulation and that the jury should have been allowed to
decide that question. (Id. at 19).
68. Brief for Appellant, supra note 3, at 21.
69. Id.
70. 642 P.2d at 788.

'71. Id.

72. Brief for Appellant, supra note 3, at 26.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol18/iss1/11
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The court presented "numerous Wyoming cases right on
point," and cited McKee as the source for Jury Instruction
17." The court found that Jury Instruction 17 was not in
error and said it was clear the jury found the danger to be
obvious. 4 The Sherman court cited Bluejacket as rejecting
the notion that comparative negligence abrogated the obvious
danger rule. 5
The court announced that two rules were involved: 1)
the obvious danger rule and 2) the rule that no duty exists
to remove natural accumulations of snow and ice; and declared that the second rule broadened the protection afforded
the possessor under the obvious danger rule.1 6 The court
explained: "Comparative negligence only abrogated absolute
defenses involving the plaintiff's own negligence in bringing
about his or her injuries. However it did not impose any
new duties of care on prospective defendants." 7 Justice
Rooney reiterated: "The adoption of the comparative negligence statute did not 'abrogate' any duty or standard of
care. It simply directed a consideration of 'comparative
fault'.""5 Both statements seem to assume that the obvious
danger rule has always been interpreted as primary assumption of risk in Wyoming. A critical review of the court's
analysis reveals several problem areas.
1. Assumption of Risk
Plaintiff contended the duty limitation contained in the
obvious danger rule was but a paraphrase of the notion that
the plaintiff assumes the risks of obvious dangers.7 Justice
Rooney, specially concurring, responded most directly to that
contention: "The fallacy in appellant's argument is in reading into the instruction a direction to the jury for an assumption of risk by appellant rather than reading therein a definition of the duty owed by appellee.""°
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

642 P.2d at 789.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 790 (citation omitted).
Id. at 791 (Rooney, J., specially concurring).
Brief for Appellant, supra note 3, at 21.
642 P.2d at 790 (Rooney, J., specially concurring) (emphasis in original).
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The judge's belief is not commonly shared by those who
have studied the question. The consensus is that the obvious
danger rule is a species of assumption of risk,8' and there is
strong criticism of the primary, or no-duty, formulation.2
One notable response to the no-duty formulation is that
"[W]e might as readily say that the defendant has no duty
to one who is contributorily negligent." 3 We are asked to
consider what, if not assumption of risk, negates a duty
which otherwise exists, simply because the danger is obvious. 4 The duty limitation has been called "incompatible with
good theory" since the victim's conduct simply contributes
to his injury. 5 It has also been urged that whatever validity
the duty limitation might have had, it should be reevaluated
in light of modern notions of social responsibility and in
light of comparative negligence.8
The obvious danger rule is not properly classified as
primary assumption of risk because it describes dangers ordinarily within the scope of defendant's duty, removed only
because they are obvious. A duty limitation is proper for
those dangers which are always outside the defendant's scope
of duty,8" but obvious dangers are not always found there.
The argument that the obviousness always takes the danger
beyond the scope of defendant's duty does not address the
simple fact that the same hole in the ground, perfectly obvious by day, is not obvious under cover of total darkness.
Protection from the dangers of the hole is within the land81. 57 AM.JUR.2d Negligence § 277 (1971); Annot.. 35 A.L.R.3d 230, 268
(1971): Mansfield, Informed Choice in the Law of Torts, 22 LA. L. REV. 17,
69 (1961); Wade, supra note 13, at 9; Green. supra note 13; P. Keeton,
Assumption of Risk and the Landowner, 22 LA. L. REV. 108, 110 (1961);
HARPER AND JAMES, supra note 13, at 1471; P. Keeton, supra note 13, at
562-63.
82. Green, supra note 13; Pedrick, supra note 13, at 100; P. Keeton, Assumption of Risk and the Landowner. 22 LA. L. REV. 108. 120 (1961); HARPER
AND JAMES, supra note 13. at 487; James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of
Land: Duties Owed to Licensees and Invitees, 63 YALE L.J. 605, 623
(1954) ; P. Keeton, supra note 13, at 562-63.
83. R. Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA. L. REV.
122, 160 (1961).
84. PROSSER, TORTS § 68 (4th ed. 1971).
85. Green, supra note 13.
86. Pedrick, supra note 13, at 100 (the doctrine of comparative negligence
changes the relevance of no-duty assumption of risk) ; P. Keeton, supra
note 13, at 563 (if assumption of risk sprang from rugged individualism
it should be re-evaluated in light of modern thought).
87. The risk that one's neighbor may be struck by lightning while he is fishing
is always outside one's scope of duty.
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owner's duty by night. To warn of the danger of the hole is
beyond the scope of the landowner's duty only when the
danger is obvious. The obviousness merely relieves defendant of any further duty to protect the plaintiff, but the
underlying duty is always there. Some say the obviousness
limits defendant's duty, but in reality the obviousness relieves defendant from his breach of duty in maintaining the
unsafe condition.
The Sherman court's formulation of the obvious danger
rule seems a classic example of what the Meistrich opinion
described as primary assumption of risk. It thus appears
that the Wyoming court adopted by implication the Meistrich
categories and classified the obvious danger rule as no-duty
assumption of risk. Even so, the court was not at liberty to
treat the rule as the Meistrich court might, because the
Wyoming court must operate under the constraints of the
comparative negligence statute. The Meistrich analysis and
the comparative negligence statute conflict. The Meistrich
court's primary assumption of risk formula demands that
the plaintiff assume the risk, whether or not he was at fault,
and declares that the defendant cannot be at fault, whether
he otherwise would be or not. Comparative negligence requires the fault of both parties be compared. The explicit
legislative determination should control.
2. The Implications of Wyoming's Comparative Negligence
Statute
The face of Wyoming's comparative negligence statute
manifests no intention to create additional duties. However,
the policies behind the statute-to compare fault of the
parties and to ameliorate the harsh consequences of traditional negligence theory-compel that conclusion.
In Wyoming, comparative negligence has changed the
rule that contributory negligence is a complete bar to plaintiff's recovery. Comparative negligence has not changed preexisting substantive law if 1) defendant is not negligent,"8
88. Comment, supra note 20, at 601.
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2) there is no contributory negligence, or 3) if the contributory negligence was as great as defendant's negligence."s
The Wyoming court has stated that the concept of comparative negligence has also abrogated the doctrine of last
clear chance." The doctrine of last clear chance ameliorated
the harsh rule of the common law that plaintiff's contributory negligence automatically barred his recovery. Even
though the plaintiff was contributorily negligent, he could
recover if the defendant, aware of the plaintiff's predicament, had the last chance to avoid an accident. There is no
practical reason to retain the doctrine under a statutory
scheme comparing fault,9" because the relative fault of each
party will be considered.2
The Wyoming court also has announced that the term
''gross negligence" has no place in comparative negligence
theory. Under traditional negligence theory, the plaintiff,
in certain circumstances, could recover only if defendant
acted with a conscious disregard for the consequences of his
actions that amounted to a major departure from the standard of reasonable care. Under the comparative negligence
statute a major departure from the standard is reflected in
the percentage of negligence assigned to defendant, so the
court declared the elimination of gross negligence to be "no
great loss toward the attainment of equity."9 " The court
indicated that public policy, as established by the comparative negligence statute, has abolished gross negligence. 4
Thus the court has acknowledged that the statute operates not only directly, by expressly removing contributory
Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187, 192 (Wyo. 1979).
Id. at 195.
Id.
Note the obvious danger rule is the converse of last clear chance: because
the danger is obvious to the plaintiff, he, not the defendant, has the last
chance to avoid the accident. For two cases emphasizing that defendant
did not have superior knowledge, so could not have prevented the accident,
see: Bluejacket v. Carney, 550 P.2d 494, 497 (Wyo. 1976); LeGrande v.
Misner, 490 P.2d 1252, 1255 (Wyo. 1971). But cf. Buttrey Food Stores v.
Coulson, 620 P.2d 549, 552 (Wyo. 1980) (plaintiff recovered because ownerdefendant had constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition).
93. Tate v. Mountain States -Tel. & TeL Co., 647 P.2d .58, 60 (Wyo. 1982)_
(citing Danculovich -v-. Brown, 593-P-2d 187, 192-93 -(Wyo. 1979))..
94. Tate v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.,647 P.2d at. 61 (Wyo.. 1982).
89.
90.
91.
92.
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negligence as a complete bar to recovery, but also indirectly,
by eliminating, through underlying public policy, certain
well-established formulations which are no longer convenient
or necessary under comparative negligence. The no-duty formulation of the obvious danger rule is inconsistent with the
policy to abolish absolute defenses and compare fault. On
the one hand, the court declares the public policy behind the
comparative negligence statute to be controlling in the elimination of inconvenient terms and impractical doctrines. On
the other hand, the court neglects public policy when the
obvious danger rule is involved, and looks only to the express
language of the statute itself.
3. Landowner Protections
The landowner has traditionally enjoyed immunity from
liability for injuries caused by the condition of his property.
In addition to the usual defenses enjoyed by all defendants,
the landowner was protected by special duty limitations and,
in varying degrees, by his victim's status as trespasser, licensee or invitee. 5 This favored status in law may have resulted from the small number of landowners and their disproportionate power, the laissez-faire attitude of the common
law, and the rugged individualism that marked earlier days.
The special status of the landowner among defendants
may have been justified in the nineteenth century, but today
it is criticized as an archaic remnant of the distant past."0
The laissez-faire attitude of that period has given way to
Landpolicies reflecting broader social responsibilities.
owners are no longer the few and favored. As their status
declines, so do the very reasons for the original protections.
Therefore many jurisdictions have abolished those protections.98
Landowner protections in Wyoming were reduced somewhat by the comparative negligence statute. Under compara95. DOOLEY, supra note 13, at 433.
96. Id. at 435.
97. P. Keeton, Personal Injuries Resulting from Open and Obvious Conditions,
100 U. PA. L. REV. 629, 641 (1952).
98. Mansfield, supra note 81, at 71.
-
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tive negligence, a negligent landowner may have to pay damages to a partially negligent plaintiff to whom recovery
would have been denied under traditional negligence. There
is no exemption in the statute for the landowner, no indica-

tion the landowner is to be treated any differently from other
defendants.
Despite the trend away from landowner immunities
elsewhere, and despite the legislative determination to compare landowner's fault, the Wyoming court continues to
protect the landowner in two ways. The no-duty formulation of the obvious danger rule keeps many landowner cases
from the purview of the comparative negligence statute. And

the obvious danger rule not only includes obvious dangers,
but has been expanded by the Sherman court to bring within
its sway even concealed dangers resulting from natural accumulations of ice and snow."
The court appears reluctant to subject landowners, particularly governmental entities, to liability for obvious dangers, especially if the danger is ice or snow. The vision of

landowners bankrupted by enormous sums paid as damages
to great multitudes of people who have accidents on the
frequently-icy streets, sidewalks and parking lots of Wyoming is a formidable one. However, acknowledging the obvi-

ous danger rule as a form of assumption of risk subject to
comparison conjures up no such vision.
Plaintiff did not urge strict liability, only that obviousness become one factor' 0 rather than the decisive factor in
determining defendant's liability. This is the consensus of
those who would abolish the no-duty obvious danger rule.10 '
99. 642 P.2d at 789. Although the court did not explain just what a concealed
danger of ice and snow might be, it seems clear that the court's intent is
to remove all duty regarding natural accumulations.
100. Brief for Appellant, supra note 3, at 24.
101. Green, supra note 13 (plaintiff's behavior is simply contributing when the
danger is obvious); Pedrick, supra note 13, at 99 (comparative negligence
requires no-duty be abolished so fault can be compared); P. Keeton, Assumption of Risk and the Landowner, 22 LA. L. REV. 108, 120 (1961) (general no-duty doctrine denying plaintiff's recovery is unwarranted); HARPER AND JAMES, supra note 13, at 1487 (blanket relief to defendant doubtful
on principle and authority; obviousnesss might satisfy duty of due care in
a given case, but not always) ; James, supra note 82 (the requirement to
make premises safe might be satisfied by obviousness, but not invariably) ;
P. Keeton, supra note 13, at 562-63 (plaintiff's knowledge is an important
factor, but shouldn't, as a matter of law, decide all cases).
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The obviousness of the danger would properly be considered
in an evaluation of plaintiff's contributing behavior.
In addition, a normal standard of reasonable care would
adequately protect the landowner's interests.' In Wyoming,
for example, sudden temperature fluctuations, uninterrupted
cold, incessant snow, and the difficulty, cost and futility of
snow removal, would all be among the circumstances to be
considered in determining whether the landowner exercised
reasonable care. Acknowledging the obvious danger rule as
a form of assumption of risk subject to comparison does not
create a duty of care impossible for Wyoming landowners
to meet, only a duty of reasonable care considering all the
circumstances.
4. Prior Case Analysis
Justice Thomas has suggested that among the responsibilities of an appellate court is an obligation to lend some
modicum of rationality to the law whenever possible. 10 That
would seem to require a more complete analysis of the issues
before the court than took place in Sherman.
In Sherman, the court told us that it had already decided, in B.luejacket, that the obvious danger rule is still
good law under comparative negligence. 4 However, there
is no indication that the impact of comparative negligence on
the no-duty obvious danger rule was raised or addressed
there. Thus, neither opinion gives any insight into the decision to retain the obvious danger rule as a duty limitation.
The Sherman court did not reconsider its holding in
Brittain, which is inconsistent with Sherman. In Brittain,
the danger was obvious, but rather than limit defendant's
duty according to the "rule" of Bluejacket, the court affirmed
a finding that plaintiff was contributorily negligent for assuming the risk.10 5 The Sherman court did not avail itself
Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases: 11, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 255,
275 (1929).
103. Tate v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 647 P.2d 58, 63 (Wyo. 1982).
(Thomas, J., specially concurring).
104. 642 P.2d at 789.
105. 601 P.2d at 536.
102.
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of the opportunity 1) to overrule Brittain,or 2) to reconcile
Brittain and Bluejacket, or 3) to distinguish them.'
McKee is cited is the source for the jury instruction
disputed in Sherman. However, there is no indication in McKee that the court applied the obvious danger rule. Rather,
the court appears to provide three bases for its decision,
without distinguishing them."' Furthermore, the Wyoming
source cited in McKee for the obvious danger rule is Watts
v. Holmes, which merely stated that the cases seem generally
to hold that there is no liability where the danger is obvious.0 8
In fact, prior Wyoming cases seem generally to hold that the
obviousness of the danger means plaintiff was contributorily
negligent or assumed the risk. Defendants had not been liable in the prior Wyoming cases because both assumption of
risk and contributory negligence barred the plaintiff's recovery under traditional negligence theory. In addition, Joly
may have modified McKee since it indicated that the McKee
obvious danger rule addresses plaintiff's behavior rather
than limits defendant's duty.0 9
5. A Rational Model
Texas recently abolished the no-duty obvious danger
Three of the reasons the Texas Supreme Court gave
are especially relevant. First, the rationale for primary assumption of risk had already been partially eroded, because
secondary assumption of risk had been abolished by the
adoption of comparative negligence."' Second, that erosion
included an abolition of elements essential to primary assumption of risk, because secondary assumption of risk inrule. 110

106. A rough calculation suggests a possible basis for distinguishing Brittain
and Bluejacket. Wyoming has one obvious danger rule for landowners (no
duty is owed) and a second for master/servant and all other cases (the

obviousness will be a factor in determining plaintiff's contribution to the

accident).
See supra text accompanying notes 24-42.
386 P.2d 718, 719 (Wyo. 1963).
483 P.2d 244, 246. See supra text accompanying note 50.
Parker v. Highland Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1978), rev'g, 545
S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976). See generally Note, "No-Duty" Doctrine
Abolished in Negligence Actions in Texas, 10 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 278
(1978).
111. 565 S.W.2d 512, 517 (Tex. 1978).

107.
108.
109.
110.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol18/iss1/11

18

Lauer: Torts - Assumption of Risk and the Obvious Danger Rule - Primary

1983

CASE NOTES

391

eludes and is inseparable from primary assumption of risk."'
Third, the purpose of comparative negligence-to apportion
fault-was incompatible with primary assumption of risk
which is an absolute bar."'
These three factors also exist in Wyoming. The court
in Sherman refused the opportunity to give real effect to the
notion that comparative negligence abolishes absolute defenses. The Wyoming court declined the invitation to set
clear guidelines, to rectify discrepancies in previous law,
and to give supporting reasons for its retention of the
archaic no-duty formulation of the obvious danger rule.
CONCLUSION

In Sherman v. Platte County, the Wyoming Supreme
Court clings to the antiquated notion that the landowner
owes no duty for obvious dangers, thus keeping such negligence cases out of the purview of the comparative negligence
statute-a legislative determination to compare fault in all
negligence cases. The legislative mandate seems to require
1) an acknowledgment of the usual duty of reasonable care,
2) an examination of defendant's breach of that duty, and
3) contributing behavior by the plaintiff, to balance the
equities. The no-duty formulation of the obvious danger rule
strictly predetermines the equities and precludes a comparison of fault.
BARBARA L. LAUER

112. Id.
113. Id.
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